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G. N. Magliocca on Christian G.
Fritz’s American Sovereigns
1 Christian G.  Fritz,  American  Sovereigns:   The  People  and  America’s  Constitutional Tradition
Before the Civil War.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
2 Christian G.  Fritz’s  American Sovereigns:  The  People  and America’s  Constitutional  Tradition
Before the Civil War is a useful resource on how the process of constitutional change was
tamed during the early Republic.  The American Revolution rested on the principle that
the people were sovereign, but Fritz focuses on the subsequent debate about “whether
‘the people’ could express their sovereign will in changing constitutions only by using
government-sanctioned procedures” (3) or whether mass action by informal bodies such
as militias could bring about legitimate constitutional change.  While some of this ground
was covered in Larry Kramer’s 2004 book, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism
and  Judicial  Review,  Fritz  provides  important  new  information  and  insights  on  this
question.
3  The strength of this book is in its discussion of attempts to initiate constitutional change
at the state level – some successful, some comical, and some tragic.  Part One talks about
the revolutionary spirit that led to sweeping constitutional revisions during the 1770s
and 1780s.  Most of these reforms were made without regard to established procedures,
either  because  those  procedures  were  inherited  from  the  Crown  (and  thus  deemed
invalid) or because “[i]t was inconsistent with American constitutionalism at this early
period to believe that a constitution took precedence over the will  of  its markers or
otherwise bound the people to specified procedures” (31).  The more amusing examples
involve separatist movements within the thirteen states, such as Transylvania (now part
of Kentucky and Tennessee) or Westsylvania (in the Appalachians) that are unknown
even to well-informed lawyers and political scientists.  Fritz’s most serious case study is
Shays Rebellion, where armed citizens (mostly debtors) launched an unsuccessful attempt
to overthrow the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.  He uses this example to raise a
critical issue:  When does the need for governmental stability trump the revolutionary
rights of the people?    
4  Part  Two  assesses  the  Federal  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787,  which  ended  up
straddling  the  procedural  and  revolutionary  visions  of  popular  sovereignty,  and
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subsequent  disputes  among  that  generation  about  how constitutional  change  should
occur.  After all, the conclave that met in Philadelphia was an irregular institution that
was  not  authorized under  the  procedures  set  forth in  the  Articles  of  Confederation.
 Moreover,  the  ratification  of  the  new  Constitution,  through  state  conventions  of
delegates elected solely for that purpose, was flatly inconsistent with the procedures in
the Articles and in the existing state constitutions.  Nevertheless, the Framers were able
to justify these extraordinary actions because, as Madison explained in Federalist #40, “[i]n
all  great changes of established governments,  forms ought to give way to substance”
(138-39).
5  On the other  hand,  the Framers  also  took the view that,  henceforth,  constitutional
change must  come about through the procedures in Article Five of  the Constitution.
 Thus, when citizens in Pennsylvania rose up during the “Whisky Rebellion” of 1794 to
protest the validity of federal excise taxes, President Washington rejected their activities
as anarchy and led an army against them.  And when they convened a convention to
petition Congress, the President issued a proclamation calling the meeting “subversive of
good order, contrary to the duty that every citizen owes to his country, and to the laws”
(169).   The  protestors  responded  (unsuccessfully)  that  the  Administration’s  tactics
reduced “the people to mere machines” and subverted “the very existance of liberty”
(173).   In  effect,  the  United  States  was  passing  through  the  same  problem  that  all
revolutionary countries face, which is that popular sovereignty must at some point be
channeled  away  from mob  action  into  regular  procedures  that  allow for  broad  and
peaceful participation.  Fritz also deftly explores this dilemma in relation to the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions, in which Jefferson and Madison used an unorthodox approach
to challenge the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Hartford Convention, through which various
New England states threatened secession over President Jefferson and Madison’s policies,
and  the  views  of  John  C.  Calhoun,  who  argued  that  the  states  could  exercise  their
sovereignty by nullifying unconstitutional federal laws. 
6  Part Three returns to state constitutional practices—this time during the mid-nineteenth
century – and describes the continuing debate (now more evenly divided) about whether
legitimate change could be grounded purely in popular expressions of dissatisfaction or
must pass through lawful forms.  That question reached a boiling point during the Dorr
Rebellion  of  1842,  in  which  disgruntled  Rhode  Islanders  sought  to  write  a  new
constitution to replace the colonial charter, which was still in force and still required
property  ownership  as  a  predicate  for  voting  rights.   When  reformers  convened  a
convention and held a referendum on their proposal, the established government refused
to recognize its legitimacy and open warfare broke out.  Fritz’s discussion of this episode,
whose  resolution  was  rather  ambiguous  on  the  sovereignty  question,  is  particularly
interesting and thoughtful.
7  There are two principal weaknesses in the book.  The first is that Fritz relies exclusively
on a rather narrow concept of constitutional change – new constitutional text.  Thus, he
fails to consider a middle ground between specific amendments that must pass through
strict  procedures  and  broad  exercises  of  popular  sovereignty  that  lead  to  new
constitutions.  Plenty of informal constitutional change occurred in ante-bellum America
through court decisions, changes in custom, and institutional transformations that came
about through a mix of procedural and popular pressure.  Andrew Jackson’s destruction
of the Second Bank of the United States or the Compromise of 1850 are two examples.
 Second, by omitting the secessionist conventions of 1860-61 from his discussion, Fritz
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loses the chance to answer the question he raises – why did Americans eventually reject
the idea that irregular bodies could produce new constitutional text?  The answer, of
course, is that the Civil War discredited the idea of popular action outside of established
procedures with respect to constitutional reform.  While the early decades of American
history are worthy of careful study, they do always shed light on the Republic’s most
profound controversies.
8 Gerard N. Magliocca is a Professor of Law at Indiana University–Indianapolis.
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